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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEFORE THE HONORABLE VINCE CHHABRIA, JUDGE

| IN RE ROUNDUP PRODUCTS    | ) MDL No. 2741              |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| LIABILITY LITIGATION,     | ) Case No. 16-md-02741-VC   |
|                           | )                           |
|                           | )                           |
| LORETTA I. PENNIE, et al. | )                           |
| -7 1 . 166                | )                           |
| Plaintiffs,               | )                           |
| Vs.                       | ) No. 3:17-cv-01711-VC      |
|                           | )                           |
| THE MONSANTO COMPANY, et  | )                           |
| al.,                      | )                           |
|                           | )                           |
| Defendants.               | ) San Francisco, California |
|                           | ) Thursday, June 15, 2017   |

## TRANSCRIPT OF OFFICIAL ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING OF PROCEEDINGS

FTR 10:03 a.m. - 10:24 a.m. = 21 minutes

## **APPEARANCES:**

For Plaintiffs Pennie, et al.:

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(by telephone - listening only)

(Appearances continued on following page.)

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**APPEARANCES**: (cont.) For Defendant Monsanto Company: Hollingsworth, LLP 1350 I Street NW #900 Washington, D.C. 20005 BY: JOE G. HOLLINGSWORTH, ESQ.

## Thursday, June 15, 2017

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10:03 a.m.

## PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is now in session, the honorable Vince Chhabria presiding. Please be seated.

Calling case number 16-MD-2741, Roundup Product Liability Litigation, and 17-CV-1711, Pennie, et al., versus Monsanto Company, et al.

Counsel, please step forward and state your appearances for the record. To the podiums, please, thank you.

MR. WISNER: Good morning, your Honor. Brent Wisner on behalf of the plaintiff. With me is my associate Pedram Esfandiary.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Good morning, your Honor. Joe Hollingsworth on behalf of Monsanto Company.

THE COURT: Good morning. So we -- I think we can have a kind of a brief discussion.

Mr. Hollingsworth, maybe I'll start with you.

I think that, you know, you've argued against remand on a couple of bases that I think are unreasonable, right? I mean, they have not stated a claim, they're not pursuing a claim under FIPRA, there's no reasonable argument that there was federal officer removal, and I don't think we need to discuss those.

I think the one question is the question I raised in the supplemental brief -- in the request for supplemental briefs, which is the *Grable* question, and it seems to me that you're right that adjudication of this federal question is necessary to adjudicate the state law claims, fraud and probably failure to warn too, I would think, but -- and it's certainly disputed.

So the two parts of that test I think are met, but the question becomes, I guess, whether you could meet the third and the fourth parts of the test, whether it's a substantial federal question, in the context of things, and whether, from a prudential standpoint, it would somehow upset, you know, Congress' understanding of the appropriate federal/state balance for these claims to be adjudicated in state court.

And on that, I guess -- I think you probably have an uphill battle, mainly because Congress has said there's not going to be a private federal cause of action under FIPRA for misbranding or mislabeling, but there can be state law causes of action that assert -- as long as they're sort of co-extensive with FIPRA and state law doesn't try to outlaw something that FIPRA would allow.

So that seems to me to reflect a contemplation by Congress that these claims will be adjudicated in state court.

So I guess it's hard for me to see how you win on the third and fourth parts of the test.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Well, as to -- let's start with substantial, your Honor. As to substantial, given that the court has to take the Complaint as it's stated, we didn't write the Complaint, the plaintiffs did. As to substantial, there are a number of issues that they have pleaded here and that your Honor has called out in his order, and I don't know whether I need to go back to the specific -
THE COURT: No, you don't.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: -- provisions of the Complaint --

THE COURT: No, I've read them.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: -- a number of substantial
issues --

THE COURT: But that goes -- it seems to me that that goes to whether it's necessary to adjudicate a federal question in the context of the state law claims. They may disagree. I think it is, and I think that the language in their Complaint kind of reflects a concession that it is, that the -- you know, state law has to be co-extensive with what FIPRA requires and doesn't require, allows/doesn't allow.

They might disagree with me on that, but I don't think it matters, because I don't see how that language goes to the third and fourth parts of the test, and the third and fourth parts of the test, as I understand it at least, are much more about, you know, sort of how important this question is in

the grand scheme of the case and how weird would it be to have this federal question adjudicated in state court.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: I think your Honor --

THE COURT: And this doesn't seem weird.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: I think your Honor needs to accept that it's important because they've pled it as important, and they've argued some of those facts to your Honor before in connection with other proceedings in front of this Court. Your Honor knows how serious it is.

The pleadings make the involvement of the federal officer absolutely necessary to the claims that they've made in the case, because --

THE COURT: Well, but if there was no -- I don't agree with that, and I don't think that if -- if they stated in their Complaint that, you know, proving that there was collusion between Monsanto and the EPA is essential to our case, I don't think we'd have to defer to that. I mean, the reality is that it's not, right?

I mean, whether there was collusion between Monsanto and EPA or not, they could still win their case, and it's not clear to me how important -- I mean, it seems, in the grand scheme of things, relatively unimportant whether there was collusion between Monsanto and EPA, because they don't need that to win their case.

And as we've discussed in the context of discovery

disputes that we've had in these cases, the EPA's conclusion about glyphosate is relevant. It's not the most important thing to whether glyphosate causes cancer or whether the case should go to the jury on whether glyphosate causes cancer.

It's not the most important thing. It's relevant, but the EPA's conclusion would have that level of relevance regardless of whether there was collusion between Monsanto and EPA officials.

So I don't -- yeah, they make a lot of noise about collusion, I guess because it's, you know, good atmospherics for them, but that doesn't mean that it's a very important part of their case.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Well, two things, your Honor, in response. One is that *Grable* says that your Honor should use a commonsense approach to the kaleidoscopic things that can happen when federal issues arise, and I've never seen a case like this. In my 44th year, I've never had to deal with allegations like this. They seem to be proper for a federal court to be deciding, and not for a state court to be deciding. That's number one.

Number two goes to the way the Court has treated the importance of EPA thus far, and that, your Honor, with all due respect, is only in the context --

THE COURT: You mean in our cases here?

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Yes, that's only in the context of general causation proof. I can almost guarantee your Honor that when Mike Miller gets in front of a jury here, if he ever does, pray tell, the first thing that he's going to be talking about is the collusion between EPA and Monsanto, and the illegality of it and the illegality of the actions of a federal officer.

That is the reason that *Grable* says that your Honor needs to --

THE COURT: Mr. Miller's bluster is not going to be tolerated in any trial that takes place in this court. So I don't think that Mr. Miller's bluster is a helpful argument for you here in this -- in connection with this remand motion.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Well, let me back up, then, from that. The issue of the secondary nature of whatever it is EPA did in connection with these plaintiffs' proof of claims is something that your Honor has addressed so far, as far as I'm aware of, only in the context of the proof of general causation, the general causation aspect of this claim.

All of the liability issues -- let's leave

Mr. Miller out of it. All of the liability issues in this case
will bring all that stuff right back to the floor your Honor,
right here or in some kind of a forum, be it federal or state.

THE COURT: Well, it sounds like we might have to

have a motion in limine about that and, you know, in state court there can be a motion in limine about how much, you know, how much focus can be placed on allegations of collusion between EPA and Monsanto, if there is even enough evidence on that issue to go to a jury at all.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Well, they have made the allegations, and there are a number of places in the Complaint where they make these allegations. I think there are nine or ten specific paragraphs that I counted in preparing for this argument.

Taking those at face value, I think based on the commonsensical approach that *Grable* talks about, which is a different approach than was ever taken before to questions of whether or not a case arises under federal law, as your Honor is aware, is a different approach.

It seems to me, based on this extraordinary, unique Complaint, that this Court ought to accept the removal of these cases from a state jurisdiction, so that this Court can apply the uniformity and in the sense that federal courts can bring to litigation of issues that involve the interpretation of so many federal questions.

Just the -- going back to the issue of misbranding, just the issue of whether misbranding is an equivalent claim to a state law failure to warn claim is a really complicated issue that I think, in itself, presents a federal question under

Grable, your Honor. So that's one.

THE COURT: Sorry, go ahead.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: So that's part one of my answer to your introductory comments.

Part two would have to do with the fourth element of Grable. I don't think that -- I think this case deserves to be in federal court for the reasons that the fourth element addresses, and I don't think that -- I think this case is so unique and extraordinary that we're not talking about opening the floodgates here, because we have a case that involves collusion, i.e., an agreement --

THE COURT: Well, that's really what --

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: I looked up collusion, and --

THE COURT: That's really what your -- I mean, you are really hanging your hat on these allegations about collusion between EPA and Monsanto, and the reason this case is so different from any number of other cases, fraud or failure to warn cases out there, is because of this allegation of collusion between EPA and Monsanto. That is really what you're hanging your hat on.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Well, the Complaint makes proof of a federal claim essential to their case in the first place. I'm not sure that I'm taking your Honor's questions in order here, but they have asserted a federal claim that Monsanto's product, Roundup, containing glyphosate, is misbranded, and

then they go on in the same paragraph of that Complaint and say 1 that to the extent California law imposes a duty or obligation 2 on defendants that exceeds those required by federal law, 3 plaintiffs do not assert them. 4 So that, it seems to me, puts them in -- that answer 5 is your Honor's --6 7 THE COURT: But you're going back to, like, the first --8 MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: The first question, yes. 9 THE COURT: -- the first part of the test. 10 11 MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Yes. THE COURT: And I'm telling you that I'm giving you 12 13 the first part of the test. 14 MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Okay. I didn't completely 15 understand that. 16 Well, then, in response to the fourth part of the 17 test, your Honor, I don't think that your Honor's decision to deny the motion to remand opens up any floodgates that 18 interferes with the careful balance that --19 20 THE COURT: Because you are hanging your hat 21 exclusively on the allegations they make about collusion 22 between the EPA and Monsanto. 23 MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: That is part of it, and the other part of it is that they've made a specific allegation 24 25 that they can't make their case on failure to warn under

California law without proving --

THE COURT: But that opens the floodgates.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: -- the federal law involving misbranding.

THE COURT: That part of your argument does open the floodgates.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Well --

THE COURT: That means any state law claim that implicates FIPRA has to be adjudicated in federal court.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: No, any state law claim where plaintiff says that they can't make their case without proving this federal misbranding --

THE COURT: But that's effectively the law, right?

I mean, if it turns out that something -- if a representation is allowed under FIPRA, it cannot be unlawful under state law. So it doesn't matter whether they say that in their Complaint or not, it's the law. It's not a factual allegation they included in their Complaint, it's a statement about the law.

So that -- and that is true whether it's in the Complaint or not, and if that's your reason for -- if that's the basis for your insistence that this case needs to be in federal court, you're saying that any state law claim that implicates FIPRA has to be adjudicated in federal court, which is pretty weird --

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: No.

THE COURT: -- because Congress said there's no federal private cause of action under FIPRA, but it's -- any state law claim that is co-extensive with FIPRA can be pursued, and without saying that it has to be in federal court.

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: No, that's what the Supreme Court said, interpreting Congress' language, of course, in Bates, as your Honor well knows. Your Honor is very familiar with Bates, but Bates points out that the -- that it left to the Fifth Circuit to decide whether federal misbranding -- an allegation involving federal misbranding that was so seriously taken in that case, and it is here, I think, really was equivalent to Texas state law and failure to warn. That's just one issue.

The collusion issue, the illegal agreement issue, is another one. I looked up what agreement -- what "collusion" means in Black's Law Dictionary, taking a page from Judge Scalia's book, and it said what I expected. It's an agreement to do something illegal.

So sure, that's part of this Complaint. You know, we have the cleanest bureaucracy in the history of the earth in the United States. It's very, very rare that an allegation like this gets made. I've never heard of it before.

THE COURT: But I'm just not --

MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: So it's not a --

I just don't understand how that relates

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to this motion. I do understand your argument, I get it.

I want to turn to the plaintiffs, and I only have one question for you, which is about your request for attorneys' fees.

It's very tempting to award costs and attorneys' fees to you, because the bases they did assert for removal seems to me unreasonable, okay? But there does seem to be an argument for removal that they didn't make, that I think it is probably a loser, but may not be unreasonable.

So in a circumstance like that, you know, what is the answer on whether I should award your costs and attorneys' fees? I mean, it seems to me that the standard is not based on which reasons they assert for removal. The standard is whether there's an objectively reasonable basis for removal. Right?

MR. WISNER: Well, it can't be, because the fees and costs that we're seeking to recover are in response to the unreasonable reasons laid out in the Notice of Removal.

THE COURT: Do you have any cases that -- any case that stands for the proposition that if there are some bases for removal that are objectively unreasonable and other arguments for removal that might be within the range of reasonableness, that the plaintiff who files a motion to remand should get all or part of its costs or attorneys' fees because it had to deal with responding to unreasonable arguments for removal?

MR. WISNER: I did look for the sort of piecemeal concept for fees, and I did not find any case law directly on point. But I would just go to the general -- just a reading of the fee shifting statute, right? The purpose of the fee shifting is to compensate the lawyers who had to brief, argue, research, conduct all the work, responding to the arguments that they made.

Now, if the Court were to say, well, okay, but when I ordered supplemental briefing, I was really raising the reasonable argument there, and then you brief that issue and now I've decided, based on that briefing, fine, maybe we don't get fees for that portion because that related to the reasonable argument that was raised.

But I mean, a large portion of our briefing related to the federal officer jurisdiction, which is -- I don't mean to be rude, but it's quite preposterous. I mean, Monsanto is not a federal officer. It's ridiculous.

We spent a lot of time working on that and, you know -- "we" meaning myself and my associate --

THE COURT: If it's so ridiculous, why did you have to spend so much time working on it?

MR. WISNER: Well, I mean, because we hold ourselves to a certain standard of litigation and briefing in federal court as well as state court. We pride ourselves in being good lawyers, your Honor.

THE COURT: Did they bring -- I can't remember -- in their Notice of Removal, did they raise the *Grable* issue at all?

MR. WISNER: Oh, absolutely. I mean, in those rules, I think upwards of 40 pages, it covers everything under the sun, but that's not what we argued about. We argued -- and I mean, I know you didn't want me to get into the merits a little bit, but I just want to point out that we're really talking about two different issues. Right? The collusion issue and the FIPRA issue, and I think it's pretty clear that the FIPRA issue, the Court feels is necessary -- we disagree, and we've argued that in our briefing, I won't repeat it now -- is not necessary, but it would upset the balance of state court, because it would essentially make every failure to warn case involving an EPA product removable.

But the second issue is collusion, and I think there, collusion is not a necessary element of our case. And I think it's going to be sort of interesting, when we do get to trail and we have that motion in limine where they seek to exclude any reference to the collusion that we say occurred between Jess Rowland and Monsanto, we're going to be pulling up these briefs and saying, well, he said it was the most important issue in the case. They can't argue it's not relevant now.

I mean, it's going to be sort of amusing when

that -- if and when that comes up. 1 THE COURT: Well, no, but the difference is that 2 3 they may --MR. WISNER: I know. 4 THE COURT: -- they are referring to your 5 allegations of collusion, and then they will say that, A, it's 6 not -- even if it were an important question, they didn't come 7 8 up with any evidence. 9 MR. WISNER: And at the end of the day, it doesn't 10 really matter what we say, it matters what the Court believes is relevant and admissible, depending whether it's in state or 11 federal court. 12 13 So -- and I recognize that, but I'm just saying, you 14 know, that issue is not necessary, so that issue doesn't get 15 past the first element, but the issue of FIPRA, which you 16 believe does make it to the second or third, doesn't pass that, 17 because that would fundamentally upset the balance. 18 THE COURT: Yeah, I really just wanted to know if you had any case law in support of your argument for all or 19 20 part of your attorneys' fees. 21 I only checked in the Ninth Circuit. MR. WISNER: 22 If you'd like, I could take a look and submit a supplemental --23 like just an order --That's okay, I already asked for 24 THE COURT:

supplemental briefing on the question.

| 1  | <b>MR. WISNER:</b> Fair enough.                               |
|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2  | THE COURT: So you had your chance. Okay, thank you            |
| 3  | all. I'll                                                     |
| 4  | MR. WISNER: Your Honor, I want to point out one               |
| 5  | option on the table, and that is, you know, while we do want  |
| 6  | our fees, maybe there's a possibility that if Monsanto agrees |
| 7  | to withdraw its opposition to all the removals                |
| 8  | THE COURT: I don't want to get into that settlement           |
| 9  | negotiation.                                                  |
| 10 | MR. WISNER: Okay.                                             |
| 11 | THE COURT: That's for you to talk to them about.              |
| 12 | So I will issue a ruling very shortly on this. Thank you very |
| 13 | much.                                                         |
| 14 | MR. WISNER: Thank you, your Honor.                            |
| 15 | <u>10:24 a.m.</u>                                             |
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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIBER

I, Leo Mankiewicz, certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript, to the best of my ability, of the above pages of the official electronic sound recording provided to me by the U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, of the proceedings taken on the date and time previously stated in the above matter.

I further certify that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken; and, further, that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

Signature of Transcriber

Date